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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING IN ACTION
DIANE GERAGHTY*
From its inception, the concept of rule by administrative process
has been subject to criticism.' The attacks have ranged from constitu-
tional challenges 2 to complaints of bureaucratic inefficiency. 3 In the
last decade the call for regulatory reform has redoubled.4 To date fed-
eral courts have assumed a principal role in responding to allegations
of administrative deficiencies.' In so doing they have been faced with
the challenge of fashioning judicial remedies which answer the con-
cerns of critics while preserving the delicate balance of power allocated
among the branches of government.
To achieve this goal, federal courts have relied heavily on princi-
ples of administrative law legitimized in earlier decades.6 Thus, the
now recognized rights of meaningful judicial review7 and procedural
regularity8 have served as the rationale for newly developed methods
* Associate Professor, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.A., University of
California, Santa Barbara; M.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University.
1. See generally Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1041 (1975).
2. The nondelegation doctrine of administrative law emerged from initial arguments that
the creation of administrative agencies authorized to perform a combination of legislative, judicial
and executive functions violated the Constitutional scheme of separation of powers. Under the
doctrine as it has evolved, courts have not imposed stringent constitutional restrictions on the
scope of agency functions. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 37-84 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BREYER & STEWART].
3. See, e.g., Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy. Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970).
4. Deficiencies attributed to the administrative process include charges that agencies are
biased in favor of industry interests, that they are headed by inexperienced appointees chosen on
the basis of political considerations, that they are unable to safeguard the growing concerns of
significant segments of society, such as consumers and the poor, and that agency procedure is
costly, time-consuming and unproductive. See generally R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE OMISSION (1970); Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1681-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stewart].
5. The legislative and executive branches have not been immune from the clamor for regu-
latory overhaul. Deregulation of certain industries, such as the airline industry, and increased use
of congressional veto power over agency action, (See Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto:
Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367, 370 (1977)), represent other forms of
governmental response to allegations of administrative failure. For a survey of additional legisla-
tive and executive efforts, see BREYER & STEWART, supra note 2, at 144-62.
6. See R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2-6 (1979).
7. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967); Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
8. See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
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for circumscribing unbridled administrative discretion. 9 Traditional
formulae for confining agency action, such as requiring that fact-find-
ing be supported by substantial evidence') and that it be consistent
with prior agency practice,"I have been augmented to include 1) close
scrutiny of the statutory authority on which the agency purportedly re-
lies, 12 2) requirement that the basis for all types of agency action, in-
cluding informal action, be articulated, 13 and 3) increased stress on the
value of procedure, both to ensure fair treatment of those subject to
agency control' 4 and to enable the court to carry out its task of review-
ing agency conduct.'
5
Several opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit during the 1979-80 term reflect the court's adoption
and use of both traditional and newer techniques developed by the fed-
eral judiciary to supervise the process of administrative decision-mak-
ing in the areas of rulemaking, adjudication and informal agency
action.
CONCEPTS LIMITING AGENCY JURISDICTION
Agency Action in Excess of Statutory Authority
Perhaps inevitably, any legislative grant of jurisdiction to an
agency customarily receives liberal interpretation by the agency. 16 A
tension is thereby created, with federal courts on the one hand bound
to defer to the agency's reading of its own governing statute, 17 and on
the other hand obligated to restrain agency action which exceeds the
9. Stewart, supra note 4, at 1711, 1716.
10. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Labor Board v.
Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 107 (1942).
11. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 234-35 (1974); Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932).
12. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); see also
Stewart, supra note 4, at 1785-86.
13. The requirement that findings be articulated, however, is an easily met burden. See Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417-20 (1971) (no formal findings
necessary; district court may require testimony by administrative officials, but such inquiry is to be
avoided absent bad faith.); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139 (1973) (three-sentence explanation for
agency denial of an application for a branch bank was deemed sufficient).
14. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950).
15. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
16. This is facilitated by legislation drafted to give an agency broad discretion, but lacking
any meaningful standards to guide the agency in the exercise of that discretion. It is this now-
standard mode of statutory delegation which led to Professor Davis' call for increased use of
agencies' rulemaking authority to cabin administrative action. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
17. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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scope of its authority. ' 8
While courts traditionally accepted an agency's interpretation of
its own jurisdiction with little or no dissent, 19 they are increasingly as-
serting their own expertise in statutory construction to overturn agency
action. 20 Two cases decided by the Seventh Circuit this term illustrate
the trend toward narrow statutory interpretation as a means of control-
ling unwarranted agency usurpation of authority.
In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. ICC,21 petitioner rail-
roads challenged an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission re-
quiring rail carriers to publish tariffs of operating schedules between
certain points. Petitioners contended that the Commission was without
jurisdiction to require publication of the schedules in tariff form22 be-
cause the section of the Interstate Commerce Act relied on by the Com-
mission in entering its order referred only to "rates, fares and
charges, ' 23 not operating schedules.
On review, the Commission asked the Seventh Circuit to follow
what it termed the "modem view" of agency jurisdiction, stating that
an agency is empowered to take any action it deems necessary to effec-
tuate the general goals of the legislation in issue unless such action is
expressly prohibited by Congress.24 The court, however, refused to
adopt this expansive view of administrative authority. In so doing, it
distinguished an agency's use of implied powers to carry out an express
grant of jurisdiction from an agency action which would expand the
scope of its substantive authority. Reading the terms "rates, fares and
charges" literally, the court concluded that the phrase did not encom-
18. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) (1976), mandates that:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of stat-
utory right.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); BREYER &
STEWART, supra note 2, at 268.
20. The move toward affirmatively confining agency discretion by statutory interpretation
began with cases involving civil liberties. See, e.g., Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295
(1970); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
21. 607 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1979).
22. Because tariffs bind carriers with the force of law, petitioners argued that the Commis-
sion's order would subject them to possible civil and criminal liability if the published service
schedules were not met. Id. at 1206.
23. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 6 (1976).
24. 607 F.2d at 1202-03.
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pass operating schedules, and it therefore reversed the agency order.
The court held, however, that the Commission did possess the authority
to require publication of service schedules in nontariff form.
2 5
At issue in a second Interstate Commerce Commission case, Atchi-
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United States,26 was whether the
Commission properly invoked emergency powers in permitting one rail
carrier to operate over the tracks of another, bankrupt carer. The
Commission argued that it derived the authority to act from provisions
in the statute empowering the Commission to "take action during [an]
emergency to promote service in the interest of the public and of com-
merce regardless of the ownership (as between carriers) of a locomo-
tive, car, or other vehicle .... -27 Rather than broadly interpreting
this language so as to permit the agency to deal with the difficult prob-
lem of balancing the interests of rail users, employees and competitors
in the face of a fiscal crisis, the Seventh Circuit engaged in a probing
analysis of the language and history of the Commission's authority and
concluded that the Commission had exceeded the scope of its jurisdic-
tion in entering the emergency order.28 The court then forcefully re-
minded the Commission that "[ilt is courts and not administrative
agencies who are the final authorities on issues of statutory construc-
tion." 29 The court's express assertion of its own powers is part of the
trend toward use of techniques of statutory construction by the courts
to carefully oversee the exercise of agency action.
30
Estoppel as a Limit on Agency Discretion
In several opinions this term the Seventh Circuit examined the
25. In dissent, Judge Swygert argued that the Commission did have the authority to issue the
rule under other sections of the Act and pointed out the irony in the majority holding which
authorizes the Commission to require publication of the schedules in nontariff form but deprives
the agency of the ability to enforce such an order. Id. at 1206-07 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
26. 617 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1980).
27. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11 123(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
28. 617 F.2d at 494-96.
29. Id. at 496.
30. The shift in the ardor with which courts are performing their role of statutory construc-
tion does not mean that the federal judiciary has abandoned the principle that an agency's reason-
able interpretation of its own authority should be respected by the courts. In Chicago & N. W.
Transp. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 609 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit
adopted the Interstate Commerce Commission's interpretation of two statutory provisions, al-
though in one case it meant rejection of the court's own prior interpretation and, in the other,
refusal to follow the authority of other jurisdictions. In both instances the court reiterated its
belief that it is bound to defer to the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with
administering it if such an interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 1232.
Other cases in which the Seventh Circuit upheld agency interpretation of legislative language
this term include Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm.,
617 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980) and Marshall v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
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role that the doctrine of estoppel plays in defining the boundaries of
administrative action. Estoppel arguments arise in administrative law
cases in two contexts. In the first, the question is whether an agency is
prohibited from relitigating issues decided in a prior judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding; this is referred to, as collateral estoppel.31 In the
second, the issue is whether an agency is estopped from taking adverse
action against a party because of prior informal conduct by the agency




Although originally held inapplicable to the administrative proc-
ess, it is now clear that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be in-
voked in an administrative action, at a minimum, when the issue
involves a dispute of fact already decided in a formal judicial or ad-
ministrative proceeding.
33
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Continental Can Co. v. Marshall34
illustrates the use of collateral estoppel as a means of limiting an
agency's prosecutorial discretion. In Continental Can it was uncon-
tested that Continental operates eighty metal can manufacturing plants,
all using similar equipment. The Secretary of Labor issued citations
charging excessive noise levels in eight of the plants. At the hearing on
those violations Continental took the position that the agency could
require engineering controls to correct the noise problem only if they
were economically feasible, while the Secretary argued that under the
statute the issue of economic feasibility was irrelevant.35 An adminis-
trative law judge agreed with Continental Can and his decision was
eventually affirmed by the full United States Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission. The Secretary ultimately chose not to ap-
peal that ruling.
While review before the Commission was pending, the Secretary
31. See notes 33-37 itfra and accompanying text. See also Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F. Supp.
730, ajrd 353 F.2d 484, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966).
32. See notes 38-47 infra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Utah Construc-
tion & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966).
33. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Bowen v. United States, 570
F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
34. 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979).
35. Continental already had in effect a hearing protection system involving the use of ear-
plugs and earmuffs. It conceded that enclosing machines in order to control noise was technically
feasible, but argued that it was economically impossible. Id. at 592 n.2. Despite his interpretation
of the statute, the Secretary did introduce the Standard & Poor's report on Continental to show
that it could afford to make the requested changes. Id. at 596.
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filed citations against different Continental plants for noise violations.
After the Commission's decision in the first eight cases, Continental
moved for summary judgment in the remaining cases on the ground of
collateral estoppel. Continental argued that the issue of technical ver-
sus economic feasibility had already been successfully litigated before
the Commission. The Commission, however, refused to apply the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel because the Secretary of Labor, believing
economic feasibility to be irrelevant, had not actively litigated the fac-
tual issues surrounding economic feasibility in the first eight cases.
Continental then appealed to the district court, which held that the Sec-
retary was estopped from relitigation of that issue. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed, holding that the Secretary could not use the fact that he had
chosen to offer only slight evidence on the factual issue of economic
feasibility as grounds for arguing that-for collateral estoppel pur-
poses-the issue had not already been litigated.
36
The Continental Can opinion should serve as a warning to agency
officials that the doctrine of collateral estoppel can limit prosecutorial
discretion to proceed on a case-by-case basis, and additionally, can re-
sult in loss of an opportunity for judicial review of the appropriate in-
terpretation of a regulation. In Continental Can the Secretary of Labor
chose not to seek review of the OSHA Review Commission's interpre-
tation of the term "feasibility" in the first eight cases. This choice,
through the subsequent application of the collateral estoppel rule, effec-
tively precluded judicial review of both the factual and legal issues in
dispute.
Although as a general matter collateral estoppel is applicable to
administrative proceedings, differences between the functions per-
formed by courts and agencies require that the doctrine be more flex-
ibly applied in the administrative context. The Seventh Circuit
demonstrated sensitivity to this need in a case involving a Federal
Trade Commission order relating to non-prescription weight reducing
drugs. In Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC,37 the issue was whether the
Commission was required to give preclusive effect to fact determina-
tions made in earlier cases involving an identical question. The court,
citing the agency's mandate to protect the public's health and the speed
with which new discoveries are made in the field of medical science,
refused to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This relaxed ap-
36. The Seventh Circuit also held that the district court was empowered to issue an injunc-
tion without Continental having exhausted its administrative remedies, because to require relitiga-
tion in each case would constitute unconstitutional harassment. Id. at 597.
37. 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
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proach to a rule of law correctly takes into account the fact that an
agency, unlike a court, has continuing jurisdiction over subjects before
it and needs a free hand in shaping policy to reflect the changing inter-
ests of the public as a whole.
B. Equitable Estoppel
The recurrent confusion in the state of the law regarding the use of
equitable estoppel in administrative proceedings is highlighted in two
opinions decided this term. In Cheers v. HEW, 38 the court concluded
that "appellant cannot avoid the well established principle that estop-
pel shall not operate against the Government in these circumstances."
39
In Gressley v. Califano ,40 however, the court stated that "this circuit is
among the minority of jurisdictions that have applied the estoppel doc-
trine to the Government."
'4 '
Traditional notions of sovereign immunity and the concern that
judicially-imposed handicaps would impede the smooth functioning of
government led to the position that administrative agencies are not
bound by principles of equitable estoppel.42 This position, however,
has been significantly eroded in recent years. 43 Modern courts recog-
nize that there are instances where justice requires that the government
be held responsible for the harm it does its citizens in the same way that
a private person in the same circumstances would be.44 The court's
decisions in Cheers and Gressley, however, reflect the cautious ap-
proach taken by courts in applying principles of estoppel to administra-
tive agencies.
45
Cheers involved a social security applicant who failed to file a
written application as required by regulation after an agency employee
incorrectly advised him he was ineligible for benefits. In Gressley, a
social security applicant was denied benefits even though he was in-
structed that if he filed amended tax returns he would be eligible. In
38. 610 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1979).
39. Id. at 469.
40. 609 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 1267.
42. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); James v. United States, 185
F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1950); Walker-Hill Co. v. United States, 162 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 771 (1947).
43. L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 300-06 (1976).
44. See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481
F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1966);
Schuster v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962).
45. See also Champaign County v. United States Law Enforcement Assistance Adm'n, 611
F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1979).
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both cases the Seventh Circuit held that the agency was not bound by
the informal actions of its agents and thus refused to estop the govern-
ment from denying benefits.
These decisions demonstrate that, while estoppel is in principle
available as a tool for limiting agency discretion, in fact, courts con-
tinue to proceed with great care in applying it to the government.
4 6
Specifically, when agency requirements are in writing and have the
force of law, a private party will be presumed to know of the existence
of that law and will be required to follow it rather than the oral advice
of an agency employee.47 Additionally, when a case involves a claim
on the public treasury, courts are particularly reluctant to invoke the
doctrine of estoppel to permit the receipt of benefits to which the appli-
cant would not otherwise be entitled.
AGENCY ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION
Administrative Searches
As Professor Nathanson has said, "[n]othing in the law, perhaps,
better illustrates the increased reach of government in the last fifty
years than does the broadening of the power of administrative investi-
gation.' '48 In order for agencies to carry out effectively the ballooning
responsibilities delegated to them by Congress, they must have ready
access to raw information. The power of agencies to acquire informa-
tion, however, is not unlimited. The Supreme Court placed a signifi-
cant constraint on agency information-gathering procedures when it
ruled that searches conducted by agencies in the performance of their
regulatory responsibilities are subject to the constitutional constraints
of the fourth amendment.49 Thus, before an agency employee may in-
spect a business or private premises without consent, the agent is re-
quired to obtain an administrative search warrant after presenting a
magistrate with sufficient information to establish probable cause for
the search.50
46. See United States v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Fox
Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1966); Semaan v. Mumford, 335 F.2d 704, 706 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Vestal v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 F.2d 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
47. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 345 (3d ed. 1972).
48. L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 418 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967).
50. In See v. City of Seattle, the Court stated, "We hold only that the basic component of a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment--that it is not to be enforced without a suitable
warrant procedure-is applicable in this context, as in others, to business as well as residential
premises." 387 U.S. at 546.
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The Supreme Court, however, taking into account the crucial role
played by administrative agencies in protecting the public's health and
safety, has defined "probable cause" differently in criminal and civil
cases. 5' While in criminal prosecutions a warrant will issue only if the
judge finds reason to believe there has been a violation of the law, in
agency inspection cases probable cause exists if "reasonable legislative
or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satis-
fied with respect to a particular dwelling.
52
In a 1978 case, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,53 the Supreme Court
affirmed the warrant requirement for administrative searches author-
ized under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 54 even though the
agency argued that it could not effectively perform its policing obliga-
tions under the Act without the surprise advantage of warrantless in-
spections. Over the dissent of Justice Stevens,55 the Court again
applied the relaxed probable cause standards first enunciated in
Camara and See.
The Court's decision in Barlow's has generated substantial litiga-
tion and comment. 56 The broad language of the opinion left it to the
lower courts to decide under what circumstances OSHA has produced
enough information to enable a magistrate to make a probable cause
finding. Many of the issues raised but left unanswered by Barlow's are
addressed in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Burkart Randall Division
of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall.
5 7
In Barlow's, the attempted agency search was part of a general
administrative plan for industry-wide enforcement of the Act. Agency
inspectors had no particular reason to suspect violations were present at
that facility. In Burkart Randall, however, the agency inspection was
touched off by complaints from two employees regarding specific al-
leged violations. In Burkart Randall, therefore, the issue was whether
the district court erred in applying the relaxed probable cause standard
rather than probable cause in the criminal law sense. The plaintiff em-
ployer argued that because of the particularized nature of the com-
plaint and because of the need for protection against disgruntled
51. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534-35.
52. 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
53. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
55. Justice Stevens argued that a reduced standard of probable cause makes the warrant
requirement a mere formality. 436 U.S. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Rothstein, OSHA Inspections After Marshall P. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DUKE L.J.
63 (1979); Note, Propriety of Warrantless Searches by OSHA Ispectors-Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
1979 Wis. L. REV. 815.
57. 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980).
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employees' unfounded complaints, the criminal probable cause stan-
dard should apply.58 The court rejected this position, holding that
criminal probable cause is not required for either an employee com-
plaint or an administrative plan inspection.
59
The court also rejected plaintiffs argument that the warrant appli-
cation was deficient in terms of detail, holding that the compliance of-
ficer's sworn statement that employee complaints had been received
and summarizing those complaints was enough.
60
The most controversial aspect of the Burkart Randall opinion in-
volves the court's holding that the inspection authorized by an adminis-
trative warrant need not be limited in scope to the substance of those
complaints. Over Judge Wood's dissent,6 ' the court balanced the em-
ployer's interest in privacy against the purposes of the Act and con-
cluded that the "interposition of a neutral Magistrate between
inspectors and employers guarantees that inspectors will not exercise
unbridled discretion .... -62
INFORMAL RULEMAKING
Interpretation of the Terms "Order," 'Record" and "Hearing"
Since enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act 63 in 1946,
agencies have had the option of formulating regulatory policy by
rulemaking or adjudication.64 Initially, however, many agencies were
reluctant to utilize their informal rulemaking authority, perhaps be-
cause informal rulemaking does not involve the trial-type proceedings
traditionally associated with concepts of fair procedure.
65
Agencies now recognize that informal rulemaking often is the
most efficient and fairest method of setting prospective agency policy.6
6
58. Id. at 1315.
59. Id. at 1318-19.
60. The court distinguished its earlier opinions in In re Establishment Inspection of North-
west Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978) and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373
(7th Cir. 1979), where warrant applications contained mere conclusory statements that complaints
had been received. Id. at 1319-22.
61. Id. at 1326 (Wood, J., dissenting).
62. ld. at 1325. The majority's holding on the overbroad warrant issue was recently citicized
in Comment, Administrative Inspections and OSHA: Abridging Fourth Amendment Safeguards?
Burkart Randall Division of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 15 GEo. L. REV. 233, 239 (1980).
63. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
64. Prior to passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, official decisionmaking was
thought to require adjudicatory procedures. See, e.g., United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265
U.S. 274 (1924).
65. See Verkuil, Judicial Review ofInformal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Verkuil].
66. The Supreme Court recognized this in Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Chenery
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In a prophetic law review article, 67 Professor Paul Verkuil foresaw the
development of a new rulemaking model of agency decision-making
and predicted that any workable model would have to find a middle
ground between the desirability of flexible procedures on the one hand,
and the need for procedural regularity on the other.
68
The 1970s were marked by active experimentation by Congress,
agencies and the courts in their attempt to find this middle ground
which would make informal rulemaking a viable alternative to adjudi-
cation and formal rulemaking. 69 Courts concentrated on redefining fa-
miliar terms such as "order," "hearing" and "record" to conform to the
needs of the new rulemaking model.70 Additionally, they focused on
procedures which would assure principled decision-making. 7' Some of
these experiments worked, while others impermissibly crossed the nar-
row line between judicial review and judicial usurpation of legislative
authority.7 2 Two recent Seventh Circuit opinions serve as a primer on
the results of the search for a separate model of agency decision-mak-
ing.
In Sima Products Corp. v. McLucas,73 plaintiffs, the manufacturers
of x-ray-proof containers, brought a declaratory action in district court
asking that an amended Federal Aviation Administration regulation be
set aside. The amended regulation was enacted according to the notice
and comment requirements of section 553 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act,74 with plaintiffs participating fully in those proceedings.
After promulgation of the amended regulation, plaintiffs filed a
petition with the agency asking for further amendment of the new pro-
vision.75 After the agency failed to respond to the petition, plaintiffs
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Although the Court in Chenery declined to require agencies to set
policy via rulemaking rather than adjudication, it encouraged them to legislate by rule "as much
as possible." Id. at 202.
67. Verkuil, supra note 65.
68. Id. at 249.
69. See National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Bell Aerospace Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 1973).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (hearing); PBW
Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973) (final order); Deutsche Lufthansa Ak-
tiengeseilschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (record).
71. See text accompanying note 130 infra.
72. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text infra, discussing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
73. 612 F.2d 309 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1834 (1980).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) & (c) (1976).
75. Section 553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act gives interested persons "the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976).
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filed their action in district court.76
The central issue on appeal was whether it was within the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court to review the amended regula-
tion. Plaintiffs took the position that because the amendment was not
an "order" but a "regulation," the statutory provision 77 giving the court
of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review FAA "orders" was inappli-
cable.
If the Seventh Circuit had accepted plaintiffs' argument, the result
would have been that FAA regulations adopted after informal
rulemaking would not be subject to judicial review unless an aggrieved
party called upon the equity jurisdiction or declaratory powers of a
district court.
The court of appeals, however, refused to construe the term "or-
der" literally. Instead, the court adopted a functional approach, hold-
ing that if the informal rulemaking procedure generates a sufficient
record for review, then a direct appeal to the court of appeals is appro-
priate.
78
The court's adoption of the "sufficient record for appeal" standard
reflects its willingness to interpret familiar administrative law terms in
a way which conforms to the recognized need for an informal rulemak-
ing process of decision-making. Traditionally, a "record" was the
product of a trial-type proceeding. That gave rise to the argument that
where Congress provides for appeal from an agency decision, the
agency is obligated to provide an adjudicatory forum so that a "record"
can be generated. The Seventh Circuit rejected this narrow reading of
the term. Rather, the court defined "record" as the minimum informa-
tion that is required before an appellate court can perform its reviewing
function. 79 In Sima Products, the court had no trouble finding that
there was sufficient information for review, noting that the record in-
cluded notice of the proposed amendment, the comments of those re-
sponding to it, and a copy of the regulation as adopted together with
the agency's explanation of its adoption.
Scope of Review of Informal Rulemaking
If less than the formal record produced at an adjudicatory hearing
is sufficient to permit review of informal rulemaking, the question be-
76. 460 F. Supp. 128 (1978). The district court held that the court of appeals had exclusive
jurisdiction to review the amended regulation. Id. at 134.
77. 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1976).
78. 612 F.2d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 314.
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comes what is the appropriate standard for judicial review when a
traditional "record" is not before the court?
After agencies began to use extensively their informal rulemaking
powers, it became apparent that the search for the appropriate measure
for review of agency policymaking would not be an easy one. The
traditional substantial evidence standard of review seemed inapplicable
because that standard is best suited to consideration of factual determi-
nations which are the product of testimony introduced into a formal
record at an adjudicatory hearing. Informal rulemaking, however, in-
volves prospective policymaking rather than a dispute between two liti-
gants and, as we have seen, does not produce a formal evidentiary
record.
The Administrative Procedure Act provided no express guidance
in the quest for the most appropriate standard for judicial review of
informal rulemaking.80 While it had been assumed that the Act's "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standard was applicable, 8' adoption of that
standard posed the threat of too much judicial deference to agency de-
cision-making. Under section 553 rulemaking procedures, an agency
may take into account not only information introduced at the comment
stage, but any material it deems relevant. While section 553 requires
the agency to publish a "concise general statement" of the basis of any
rule adopted, it does not on its face require full disclosure of the infor-
mation taken into account in adopting the rule. This created problems
for those seeking to challenge informal agency rulemaking in the
courts, because they were effectively precluded from attacking the evi-
dentiary basis for the rule ultimately adopted. It also meant that re-
viewing courts could only overturn those agency decisions where the
agency acted beyond the limits of its jurisdiction or where the newly
enacted rule was arbitrary on its face.
One of the responses to this situation by courts and by Congress
was the development of "hybrid" rulemaking procedures. Under such
procedures, agencies would be permitted to devise agency policy with-
out having first to conduct trial-type hearings, but might be required to
procedurally supplement section 553 notice and comment require-
ments. The judicial development of hybrid rulemaking was effectively
halted by the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.8 2 There, the
80. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
81. See Verkuil, supra note 65, at 206.
82. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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Supreme Court rejected the argument that section 553 establishes the
procedural minimum for informal rulemaking and that courts can re-
quire extra procedures when such procedures are, in the court's opin-
ion, necessary for principled decision-making and effective judicial
review. After Vermont Yankee, it is up to Congress or to the agencies
themselves to make the decision about what additional procedures, if
any, should be used to supplement section 553 notice and comment
proceedings.
The Court in Vermont Yankee, however, was not insensitive to the
argument that meaningful judicial review of informal rulemaking is
necessary to stem the criticism that administrative agencies have too
much discretionary power and wield it without adequate consideration.
The Court, therefore, sanctioned the practice developed by lower fed-
eral courts, particularly the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
83 of
closely scrutinizing the sufficiency of the record for review as well as
the adequacy of the agency's explanation for its action.
The job of the reviewing court in assessing informal rulemaking is
now thought to require that the court take a hard look at the rationality
of an agency decision, carefully examining the record to be sure that
the agency considered all relevant factors in arriving at its decision. If
a record is inadequate to permit the court to perform its task fully, the
case may be remanded to the agency for fuller development of the facts
so that review is possible. 84 Additionally, courts can require that agen-
cies articulate more fully the reasoning behind their policy choices.
85
In Belenke v. Securities and Exchange Commission,86 the Seventh
Circuit addressed the scope of judicial review and the adequacy of the
informal rulemaking record and adopted a position consistent with that
evolved through the process of experimentation discussed above. In
Belenke, the proposed rule was adopted after notice and comment. In
approving the rule change, the SEC issued a twenty-four page, single-
spaced order addressing the issues relevant to the rule change, includ-
ing specific objections raised in the comment proceedings.
One of the arguments raised by the petitioners on appeal was that
the "record" before the SEC did not contain "substantial evidence" to
support its decision. In response, the Seventh Circuit noted that in an
83. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
84. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Automotive Parts and Accessories Assn. v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
86. 606 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
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informal rulemaking procedure there is no requirement of a detailed
factual record. The court went on to say that, under the statute, the
standard for review of such an order is whether the order was arbitrary
and capricious. The court made it clear, however, that the arbitrariness
standard no longer operates as a rubber stamp of agency action.
Rather, the court carefully analyzed the statutory language of the Act
and the reasoning of the agency in its approval order before upholding
the validity of the agency rule. This approach to review of agency in-
formal rulemaking represents a synthesis of the ideas formulated over




One of the criticisms of the regulatory process in recent years has
been the failure of agencies to utilize effectively their enforcement pow-
ers. 87 A judicial response to this criticism has been to find a private
right of action implied in legislation designed to ensure compliance
with agency requirements.
In Cori v. Ash ,88 the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for
determining when a private cause of action exists. The Court found
that an aggrieved person had no independent remedy when the statute
1) did not purport to create a private action; 2) did not prohibit certain
conduct; 3) did not create federal rights in favor of private parties; and
4) evidenced no legislative intent to create a private remedy.
89
In Bratton v. Shiffrin,90 the Seventh Circuit was asked to consider
the issue of whether charter air travelers have a private remedy under
the Federal Aviation Act. 91 In its initial consideration of the question,
the court applied the standards set forth in Cort v. Ash and found that
the FAA does give air travelers a right to bring suit in federal court for
violation of Civil Aeronautics Board regulations.92 That opinion was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded it for reconsideration
87. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION 257-73 (1970).
88. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
89. Id. at 78. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the
Court stressed that the primary inquiry in determining whether a private remedy is implied is
Congressional intent. Id. at 23-24.
90. 635 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1980).
91. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1978) (hereinafter referred to as FAA].
92. Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 232 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 443 U.S. 903
(1979). [The Civil Aeronautics Board is hereinafter referred to as the CAB].
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
in light of its decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington .93 In Touche
Ross, the Court refused to find that Congress intended to create a pri-
vate remedy when it merely required brokers and others to keep
records as prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On remand, the Seventh Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, distinguished
Touche Ross and reaffirmed its earlier holding. Writing in dissent,
Judge Bauer persuasively argued that Supreme Court precedent re-
quired the conclusion that air travelers have no private right of action
under the FAA.94 Specifically, he noted that the face of the CAB regu-
lation merely requires supplemental air carriers to post a performance
bond and does not expressly provide for any private remedy, create any
federal right or prohibit any conduct.95 Additionally, he pointed out
that even the majority agreed that there was scarce legislative history
on the question of Congressional intent. Finally, Judge Bauer cau-
tioned against the majority's approach which found an implied right of
action by drawing a positive implication from legislative silence on the
issue.
96
Finding a private right of action is one way to ensure that agencies
do not fail to enforce sanctions available to them under substantive
legislation. On the other hand, the consequences of finding such a right
are potentially serious. If the concept of an implied private cause of
action is overused, the twin evils of back door judicial usurpation of
administrative authority and an overload of cases on the already-bur-
dened court system may result.
Alleged agency inefficiency in enforcing legislation also gave rise
to the suit in Stewart v. EEOC.97 The 1972 Amendments to Title V11
98
provide for the administrative processing of complaints of unfair em-
ployment practices, including the right of the agency to bring a civil
action in federal court against an employer. Title VII also creates an
express private remedy for employees if the EEOC fails to meet statu-
tory deadlines setting certain times within which an agency has to act. 99
Appellants in Stewart were employees who filed unfair employ-
ment practice charges with the Commission, but the agency allegedly
failed to act on those charges or make timely reasonable cause determi-
nations. Appellants filed an action in the district court seeking declara-
93. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
94. 635 F.2d at 1232 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1233.
96. Id. at 1233-35.
97. 611 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1979).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(1) (1976).
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tory and injunctive relief which would compel the agency to act on
appellants' charges.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on behalf of the agency, holding that the agency's failure to
act in a timely fashion violated neither the Act, the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act nor the fifth amendment. The court cited, as the primary
basis for its holding, the fact that under Title VII individual complain-
ants are given a private right of enforcement in the courts.' °°
Judicial Review of Administrative Remedies
While agencies have broad discretionary powers in selecting an
appropriate remedy for violation of an organic act,' 0 ' courts nonethe-
less must review agency enforcement decisions to ensure that the cho-
sen remedy is reasonable. 0 2 Exercising this review authority, the
Seventh Circuit this term examined several agency enforcement orders.
In Keystone Steel and Wire, Division of Keystone Consolidated In-
dustries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,0 3 the Board found
that an employer violated the NLRB's mandatory collective bargaining
duty in connection with its decision to change the administrator of its
medical benefits program. In its remedial order, the Board required the
employer to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively and
additionally ordered the employer to reinstate, upon request of the
Union, the prior administrator. Calling this remedy "heavy handed,
disruptive and overly broad," the court refused to enforce the provision
which exceeded the scope of the collective bargaining issue and re-
manded the case to the agency for formulation of a more limited reme-
dial order.' 0 4
Several issues concerning the scope of an agency's enforcement
powers were present in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission. 105 Petitioners there challenged the remedial provisions of
an FTC order finding the company guilty of deceptive practices in the
recruitment of sales representatives and sales presentations to custom-
ers. Britannica was ordered, among other things, to cease and desist
from soliciting home sales unless the salesmen immediately presented
the potential customer with a printed card disclosing that the purpose
100. 611 F.2d 679, 683-84 (7th Cir. 1979).
101. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
102. See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
103. 606 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1979).
104. Id. at 180.
105. 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980).
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of the call was to sell. !°6
Petitioners asked that the order be set aside because: 1) the disclo-
sures ordered were not the least restrictive alternative for curing decep-
tion; 2) the Commission failed to state reasons for its choice of remedy,
in violation of section 557(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act; 10 7 3)
the Commission's order infringed on Britannica's first amendment
right to advertise and solicit sales; 4) the Commission abused its discre-
tion in its method of enforcement; and 5) Britannica did not have an
opportunity to rebut information it believed the Commission consid-
ered in selecting the remedy. 108
The Seventh Circuit addressed each of these arguments and re-
jected them in turn. The court found that the disclosure requirements
were reasonably related to the deceptive practices charges, stressing the
latitude which agencies should be allowed in formulating a remedy
which will further the broad interests sought to be protected by Con-
gress. 109
Secondly, the court found no violation of section 557(c) of the
APA which requires that "all decisions. . . shall include a statement of
• ..findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefore, on all
the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the rec-
ord. .... ,",o Although the Commission did not expressly state why it
rejected the argument that oral disclosures would be inadequate, the
court cited language in the order which permitted it to imply that the
agency considered and rejected petitioner's suggestion.
Additionally, the court found no first amendment violation, de-
spite petitioner's argument that the sanction imposed by the agency was
broader than necessary to correct the evil at which it was directed. The
court distinguished cases cited by petitioner"' on the grounds that
those cases, for example, did more than direct truthful disclosure, by
placing on the companies an affirmative duty of arguing a position
which they opposed.
The court also rejected the argument that, because the Commis-
sion had imposed a less restrictive requirement in a similar case against
a direct competitor of Britannica's, the Commission was prohibited
106. Id. at 967.
107. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976).
108. 605 F.2d at 970.
109. Id. at 974.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976).
Ill. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977); United States
v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aft'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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from entering a substantially different order against Britannica. While
agreeing in principle that different remedies against competitors would
be arbitrary, the court felt that because the earlier order was ten years
old and against a minor competitor, the Commission's method of en-
forcement was not capricious.'"
2
Judge Wood dissented, arguing that the remedial orders went be-
yond what was required to correct the violations and characterizing
them as "more akin to bureaucratic punishment imposed upon a com-
pany found by the Commission to be errant."
'" 3
In Marshall v. N.L. Industries, Inc.,'1 4 the Secretary of Labor filed
an action in district court, alleging that an employee had been dis-
charged in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and
seeking a back pay award. The district court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the parties already
had submitted their dispute to arbitration and that the arbitrator, while
ordering the employee reinstated, denied back pay. The employee sub-
sequently returned to work without back pay." 15
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, refusing to construe the
employee's return to work as a waiver of his right to statutory relief. In
so doing, the court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co.," 6 which held that an arbitrator's decision
under a collective bargaining agreement does not bar a subsequent Ti-
tle VII claim in federal court. The court likened the Occupational
Safety and Health Act to Title VII in that both were enacted with the
dual purpose of rectifying an employment wrong done to an individual
employee, as well as correcting a broader problem faced by workers on
a nationwide level." 7 Consequently, the court found that it would vio-
late the spirit of OSHA to make an arbitrator's decision binding,
thereby keeping an issue of potentially national importance out of the
courts. On the waiver issue, the court refused to require that an em-
ployee ignore an arbitrator's reinstatement decision and risk loss of em-
ployment in order to exercise his right to judicial relief. 18
112. 605 F.2d at 974.
113. Id. at 977 (Wood, J., dissenting).
114. 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 1221. ,
116. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
117. 618 F.2d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. Id. at 1223.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW
Preclusion ofReview
Since the Supreme Court's decision inAbbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner,"19 a party aggrieved by administrative action has had a right of
review which can be abrogated only "upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent."' 20 Congress
manifested this intent in section 701 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provides that agency action is not subject to judicial review
if review is precluded by statute or if agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.
1 2'
In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, 22 the Seventh Circuit was called upon to decide
if the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's determination that
an emergency existed in the futures trading market was committed to
agency discretion by law and thus unreviewable. The district court
found the agency action reviewable, conducted an evidentiary hearing,
and concluded that no emergency existed. The Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed on the issue of reviewability.
23
In reversing, the Seventh Circuit patterned its approach on the
question of reviewability after that taken recently by the Supreme
Court in Southern Railway v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp. 124 There,
the Court involved itself in a detailed look at the face of the Act, its
relationship to other statutory provisions, and the legislative history of
the Act, in deciding that an Interstate Commerce Commission refusal
to investigate the lawfulness of a proposed tariff was immune from ju-
dicial review.12 5
In Board of Trade, the Seventh Circuit looked at such factors as
the language of the Act ("whenever the Commission has reason to be-
lieve. .. " "in the Commission's judgment"), the absence of an ex-
press right to judicial review present in other sections of the Act and the
nature of the agency authority (carefully defined emergencies) and de-
cided that agency discretion was unreviewable as a matter of law. 26
119. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
120. Id. at 141.
121. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) & (2) (1976).
122. 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980).
123. Id. at 1022-25.
124. 442 U.S. 444 (1979).
125. Id. at 448-64.
126. 605 F.2d 1025.
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Review of Informal Administrative Action
A. Summary Judgment
Although until recently litigation in the administrative law area
has focused on the adjudicatory and rulemaking functions performed
by agencies, the bulk of the work which agencies do falls under the
rubric of informal agency action.1
27
There was a time when it was unclear whether agency action other
than rulemaking and formal adjudication was judicially reviewable. 
28
The Administrative Procedure Act contributed to the confusion by fail-
ing to make any express mention of the review procedures to be used
when informal administrative action is involved.
129
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,' 30 however, the
Supreme Court dispelled the notion that informal action is unreview-
able and held that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is the appro-
priate one for use by reviewing courts. Nonetheless, even under that
narrow standard, the Court charged reviewing courts with the responsi-
bility of scrutinizing the record on which the agency acted to ensure
that the agency decision "was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors .... ",131
That language in Overton Park formed the basis for petitioner's
argument in Milton v. Harris3 2 that the district court could not enter a
summary judgment order affirming the agency's decision to terminate
her disability benefits and seek a refund for overpayment.
In a Tenth Circuit case, Nickol v. United States, 133 the court had
concluded that the language in Overton Park exhorting thorough re-
view of an administrative record meant that, where a record contained
disputed issues of fact and where the court was required to determine if
the agency decision was supported by substantial evidence, the review-
ing process could not be done in a summary proceeding.134
In Milton the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Nickol, holding instead that the question of whether
substantial evidence supports an administrative law judge's finding is a
127. See generaly Gardner, The Procedures by Which Informal Action is Taken, 24 AD. L.
REV. 155 (1972).
128. BREYER & STEWART, supra note 2, at 525.
129. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
130. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
131. Id. at 416.
132. 616 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1980).
133. 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
134. Id. at 1391-92.
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question of law, not fact, and thus summary judgment procedures may
be used by the reviewing court.
35
B. Adequate Explanation Requirement
As discussed above, one of the requirements placed on an agency
engaged in informal rulemaking is that of articulating the basis of its
decision with enough clarity and detail to permit a court to perform its
reviewing function. This same requirement of adequate explanation is
present where an agency acts in other than its rulemaking or formal
adjudicatory capacity, a fact underscored in the court's decision in City
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board.136
City Federal Savings and a consolidated case involved challenges
to a Federal Home Loan Bank Board decision approving limited
branch bank facilities. The Board resolutions permitting the branch
banks contained only the decision reached and conclusory language
with little amplification of the reasons for the decision. The Seventh
Circuit, while noting that substantial deference is due the Board's
branch banking determinations because of the technical expertise in-
volved, nonetheless refused to affirm the Board's orders, remanding the
cases instead for a fuller explanation of the relationship between the
record and the Board's results.
137
While hesitant to develop a checklist of questions an agency must
answer before its informal decisions will be approved, the court did
provide some guidelines about what the explanation should contain.
Thus, although it is not aper se abuse of discretion for an agency to fail
to give express reasons for its decision, in cases where significant issues
are contested, it is incumbent on the agency to explain how it resolved
those issues and to provide the information on which it relied in mak-
ing its decision. According to the court, that is the minimum degree of
explanation required from the agency which will enable the court to
decide whether the agency determination was arbitrary and capricious,
the standard of review set for informal ageficy action by the Supreme
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.
138
135. 616 F.2d at 975-76.
136. 600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1979).
137. Id. at 692-93.
138. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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MOOTNESS
One of the functions served by the mootness doctrine is to guaran-
tee that one branch of government, the judiciary, will not unduly inter-
fere with the policymaking responsibilities delegated to another
branch.3 9 In the administrative law context, courts should be particu-
larly sensitive to the role that mootness can play in assuring that agen-
cies have maximum latitude in experimenting with different positions
before those positions become binding precedent.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of mootness in the admin-
istrative law context in two cases this term. In Central Soya Co. v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp.,"40 the court examined the question of under what
circumstances the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" branch of
the mootness doctrine is applicable to situations regulated by Congress
or its agencies. The court first noted that although the "capable of rep-
etition, yet evading review" doctrine normally applies to government
conduct, logic dictates that it be extended to cover cases between pri-
vate parties as well.
14 1
With respect to the "capable of repetition" requirement, the court
rejected Conrail's argument that this prong of the test is met whenever
a federal court may again be called upon to decide the legal issue in
dispute. Rather, the court said that "capable of repetition" means that
"there must be a reasonable degree of likelihood that this issue will be
the basis of a continuing controversy between these two parties. ' 142 As
for the "yet evading review" requirement, the court concluded that that
language refers to actions which are otherwise reviewable, but which
are too short in duration to be fully litigated.
43
Applying these definitions, the court dismissed as moot a case in
which a shipper challenged the decision of a railcarrier to reduce the
number of cars allocated to it under a booking agreement. The period
for which the cars were needed had ended and the court refused to
speculate on the possibility that these two parties might sometime in
the future enter into a similar contract.'44
In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures
139. See Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 376
(1974).
140. 614 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 688-89.
142. Id. at 689.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Trading Commission ,' 4 5 however, the court found the case to fall
squarely within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doc-
trine. The court correctly hypothesized that it was likely that the Com-
mission, authorized by statute to use emergency powers because of the
frequent fluctuations in the futures market, would again invoke these




The bulk of the work performed by courts reviewing administra-
tive decisions continues to be the stock-in-trade tasks of statutory inter-
pretation and application of legal principles to individualized facts.
This article has focused on several of the cases decided by the Seventh
Circuit in its 1979-80 term which highlight efforts on the part of the
federal judiciary to respond to charges of significant failures in the ad-
ministrative process.
The cases discussed, however, do not represent the totality of ef-
forts by courts and Congress to supervise administrative decision-mak-
ing. Other approaches, for example, include a relaxed view of standing
to challenge administrative action, an expanded due process right to be
heard before adverse agency action, increased access to information in
the possession of the agency and liberalization of restrictions on public
participation in agency proceedings themselves. Cases involving these
areas, as well as the trends discussed in this article, will serve to shape
the response of the Seventh Circuit to administrative law issues in the
court's upcoming terms.
145. 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979).
146. Id. at 1020-21.
